Rav Moshe Feinstein, ztz”l

Rabbi Moshe Feinstein was, along with Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, one of the two most important [deciphers of the code of Jewish Law] poskim of the 20^th century. Reb Moshe was a towering scholar whose influence, authority, and writings impacted the life of all Torah-observant Jews world-wide. He was particularly important to North American Jewish communities. A prominent American posek recently described Rav Moshe as the “Maimonides of American Jewry.”

In the middle decades of the 20^th century, Rabbi Feinstein penned a number of letters¹ addressing Noahide practice. He devotes many paragraphs to specifically untangling the concept of Chiddushei Dat.

A full overview of Rav Moshe’s analysis would require far more space than we have allotted here. Translations of Rav Moshe’s letters are being prepared as an appendix to this course. We will present here a summary of Rav Moshe’s writings on the subject.

The Source of Chiddushei Dat

Just as Noahides have Chiddushei Dat, Jews have a similar prohibition to Chiddushei Dat called Baal Tosif, which specifically prohibits Jews from creating new mitzvos or adding to and modifying existing mitzvos.² Non-Jews, however, do not have the prohibition of Baal Tosif. In fact, we only know of the Noahide prohibitions against Torah study and Shabbat observance because of specific Torah verses from which these prohibitions are derived.³ From where, then, does Maimonides derive the prohibition of Chiddushei Dat?

Rav Moshe explains that there are commonalities in the underlying reasons behind these prohibitions. For example, the Talmud and Midrash both describe the study of Torah (in an impermissible manner) and keeping Shabbat as misappropriations of mitzvos commanded only to Israel. By analyzing these commonalities, the other writings of Maimonides, and many other sources, Rav Moshe concludes that Chiddushei Dat is not only the underlying reason for the Noahide prohibitions of Torah study and Shabbat observance, is a general principle governing Noahide practice. This is why Maimonides writes: The general rule governing these matters is this…

Rav Moshe explains that Shabbat observance and certain types of Torah study are singled out because they are the most severe transgressions for Noahides and the only ones involving the death penalty. Note, however, that this penalty is at the hands of heaven and not administered by an earthly court. This is what Maimonides means when he writes: …he is obligated to die for his actions. However, he is not actually executed.

Voluntarily Keeping Other Mitzvot

Rav Moshe notes a peculiar issue in §10 and the Radbaz’s interpretation:

§10 Should a non-Jew wish to perform one of the Torah’s other mitzvos in order to receive merit/benefit, we should not prevent him from doing so even according to all of its details.

Radbaz: If he wants to perform a mitzvah, saying that he has an obligation in the matter, we do not allow him to do so. However, he may perform it in order to receive reward as one who performs a mitzvah voluntarily. This is why he [Maimonides] is careful to write: “… in order to receive merit/benefit…”

As we mentioned in the previous lesson, the Talmud explicitly states that a non- Jew who performs a Jewish mitzvah for the sake of reward does not actually receive reward for his mitzvah. How are we to explain this contradiction?

There is a classical debate in the Talmud as to whether or not a Jew who performs a mitzvah in which he is not obligated is considered pious or foolish.⁴

The Talmud Yerushalmi, Shabbos 1:2, states that a Jew who performs a mitzvah in which he is not obligated is a hedyot – a foolish person. However, there are numerous examples in Rabbinic literature⁵ of people receiving praise for performing such mitzvos! Why is the performance of a voluntary mitzvah sometimes called praiseworthy and sometimes called foolish? The answer lies in the nature of “non-obligation:”

·         Sometimes, a mitzvah exists but an individual is not obligated to actually fulfill it. For example, all Jews are commanded in the mitzvah of Tefillin. Nevertheless, women are exempted from wearing Tefillin.6 Theoretically, if a woman dons Tefillin in the right way and with the right intention, she may receive reward and she is not called a hedyot. This example, it should be noted, is only theoretical. For many reasons in halakha, women do not wear Tefillin.

·         Rav Moshe discusses the relationship of a Jewish child under the age of 12 or 13 to the mitzvos. Below these ages, children are not obligated in the mitzvos. Nevertheless, a Jewish child is still bound in the covenant of the mitzvos even though their specific obligations are not yet in force. Rav Moshe writes that children receive reward for these voluntary mitzvos.

·         In a case when no mitzvah exists for a person, but he performs the mitzvah anyway, such a person is called a hedyot – a foolish person. In this situation, the person is called foolish because their action is not holy and holds no spiritual value. For example: on sukkot there is a mitzvah for Jews to eat and sleep in the sukkah. If it is raining, though, one is exempted from eating and sleeping in the sukkah.

The Rama7 writes that a Jew who decides to sit in a sukkah despite the rain is called a hedyot. In the case of rain, the mitzvah of eating and sleeping in the sukkah is not suspended; rather, it ceases to exist entirely. In such a case, the sitter is merely sitting outside in the rain! Rather than being a holy act, their “mitzvah” has become a foolish one! Nachmanides writes similarly:⁸

In the Talmud Yerushalmi it is stated: “Anyone who performs a mitzvah in which he was not commanded from the Torah is a hedyot.” This is discussing someone who performs a mitzvah to which he has absolutely no connection whatsoever. Then, he is, in effect, adding to the Torah. However, one who does a mitzvah of the Torah according to its proper performance even though he was not commanded in it, such as women, receives reward.

Nachmanides adds to the definition of hedyot. A Jew who performs a mitzvah that in which he has no obligation is called foolish because he thinks that he is acting piously. However, he may actually be committing a transgression: adding to the Torah!

To fully appreciate the concepts of Baal Tosif and hedyot, we need to understand the idea of Bitul Hayeshus – the nullification of ego and will.

Bitul - My Will vs God's Will

Who defines for us what actions are holy or not? Can we decide that an act is holy or a mitzvah on our own? No, we cannot. The entire concept of mitzvos is that God has defined for us what is meaningful and holy and what is not meaningful and holy. Therefore, our will is, to a large degree, irrelevant. Our duty as servants of HaShem, God, is Bitul Hayeshus - to nullify our will in the search for and servitude of His will. We must strive to understand God’s will, learn to recognize it, and learn how to fulfill it according to its specific details. The objective guidepost for determining God’s will and its fulfillment is the study of the Torah according to the principles of Torah elucidation handed down from time immemorial.

In certain areas, God has given the man leeway to beautify the mitzvos, or to declare certain things as holy or “set aside” for service to God. However, if a Jew decides to do a mitzvah where it clearly does not apply, that Jew is “forcing” his will upon God.

If a Jewish farmer in the Midwest decides to not work his field on the shemitta (sabbatical) year⁹, insisting that he is doing it for God, he is called a hedyot. For one, the mitzvah only exists in Israel. God’s desire is only that the Holy land rest in the sabbatical year; not any other land. To rest another, non-holy land in the sabbatical year is to diminish the importance of Israel and the mitzvah of shemitta. Second, our farmer is endangering his livelihood, which is foolish. Lastly, if he loses his farm or creates tension among his family or business associates because of his “religious” obstinacy, then it causes a Chillul HaShem – a desecration of the Torah.

All of the foregoing applies to Jews. The Jewish people are VERY stringently enjoined against the idea of forcing their will upon HaShem.

If this is case for Jews, Rav Moshe wonders why we should assume that it is any different for Noahides? After all, there are not two Torahs! The fundamental mechanics of the Torah apply equally to Jews and Noahides!

It is vitally important for anyone wishing to adopt a Noahide identity to embrace this point: there are not two Torahs. The same mechanics that govern Jewish observance of the 613 mitzvos also govern the Noahide observance of the 7 mitzvos. Just as the Jews have Baal Tosif, the Noahides have Chiddushei Dat. The concept of hedyot applies equally to both.

Rav Moshe’s Reading of Maimonides and the Radbaz

§9 A non-Jew¹⁰ who delves into the Torah is obligated to die. They should only be involved in the study of their seven commandments.

Similarly, a non-Jew who rests, even on a weekday, observing that day similarly to a Shabbat, is obligated to die. Needless to say, this is also the case if he creates a festival for himself.

These two prohibitions are unique because they are the most severe. This is why they are singled out by the Talmud and Maimonides.

The general rule governing these matters is this: they may not originate a new religion or create/perform mitzvot for themselves based on their own reasoning.

The prohibition of Chiddushei Dat is not limited to Shabbat, Festivals, and Torah study, but applies to all mitzvos of the Torah. Chiddushei Dat is transgressed whether a non-Jew creates a new religious practice for himself, or behaves as if he is obligated in the other mitzvos of the Torah.

Either convert and accept all the mitzvot or uphold their commandments without adding or detracting from them.

The Most Important Point

This point is perhaps the most important yet: the prohibitions of Chiddushei Dat do not exist to reduce or restrict the identity of a Noahide. Similarly the prohibition of Baal Tosif does not exist to reduce or restrict the identity of a Jew. Instead, Chiddushei Dat exists to define the boundaries of Noahism. It clearly delineates where Judaism ends and Noahism begins.

Noahism may drink from the same well as Judaism and share its core beliefs and values, yet it is a religious identity wholly separate and distinct from Judaism. Noahides have their own special mitzvos and missions in the world, as the Jews have theirs. Noahism is not a “Judaism for non-Jews.” Neither is being a Noahide a way for non-Jews to participate in Judaism. For the non-Jew who wishes to observe Jewish rituals or festivals, Maimonides teaches that conversion to Judaism is his only option.

If a gentile delves into the Torah or Shabbat, or innovates a religious practice, he is beaten, punished, and informed him that he is obligated to die for his actions. However, he is not actually executed.

This is talking about a case when the non-Jew lives under Jewish sovereignty. He is liable to punishment for observing these mitzvos. Specifically, he is liable to death at the hands of heaven.

§10 Should a non-Jew wish to perform one of the Torah’s other mitzvos…

The prohibition of performing other Torah mitzvos is nowhere as severe as Shabbat, festivals, or Torah study. In fact, a non-Jew may choose to perform other Torah commandments subject to specific conditions. These conditions are the boundaries of Chiddushei Dat.

Should a non-Jew wish to perform one of the Torah’s other mitzvos… This indicates that a non-Jew may only occasionally perform other Torah mitzvos. If a non-Jew decides to regularly observe one of the mitzvos, he has effectively added a religious observance and transgresses Chiddushei Dat.

In order to receive merit/benefit

The Radbaz writes: If he wants to perform a mitzvah, saying that he has an obligation in the matter, we do not allow him to do so. However, he may perform it in order to receive reward as one who performs a mitzvah voluntarily. This is why he [Maimonides] is careful to write: “… in order to receive merit/benefit…”

Rav Moshe explains that any spiritual motivation makes the mitzvah a religious act. This is even if the mitzvah is performed only occasionally. Therefore, the only permissible motivation can only be ulterior. However, what ulterior, non-spiritual, motives could there possibly be for keeping kosher or many other mitzvos? Maimonides is telling us that, although the non-Jew may not perform the mitzvah from a sense of spiritual connection or need, he may for the obligation of receiving reward. This sets the threshold for permitted motivation in performing one of the Torah’s mitzvos. However, Rav Moshe explains this is only pertaining to the motivation. The non-Jew does not actually receive reward for doing the mitzvah. This is because the Talmud explicitly learns that non-Jew does not receive reward if he performs a mitzvah as such.

 Nevertheless, mitzvos that provide a logical or tangible, real-world benefit may certainly be adopted. We will elaborate on this idea in a moment.

 … we should not prevent him from doing so even according to all of its details.

 Unlike Shabbat, festivals, and certain types of Torah study, we must do not stop a non-Jew from trying to do the mitzvah. However, this implies that we should neither encourage nor assist a non-Jew in doing so.

If he brings an animal to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, we should accept it.

Rabbeinu Nissim Gaon writes:¹¹

Not all of the Seven Laws and their derivations require revelation. For example – the obligation to recognize God, to obey Him, and the obligation to serve him – all of which are rational and can be logically derived.

Certain aspects of Noahide worship and practice are permitted or proper not because they are commanded in the Torah, but because they are compelled by logic and basic, common, religious needs. Therefore, Rav Moshe points out that certain mitzvos and religious acts are certainly permitted and they may even be done according to all their Torah details. Such mitzvos would include prayer and certain types of offerings and tithes.

To Summarize Rav Moshe

·         Noahides may not keep Shabbat or study those parts of Torah prohibited to them. The details of these prohibitions will be discussed shortly.

·         Noahides should not be encouraged to perform any other mitzvos of the Torah.

·         If a Noahide insists on performing a mitzvah to which he is not commanded, it is permitted provided that his motivation is not at all spiritual. In such a case, he may even perform the mitzvah according to all of its details.

·         Even so, a Noahide should not perform such a mitzvah regularly because then, regardless of his motivation, it constitutes the establishment of a new religious practice.

·         The mitzvah, however, has no spiritual merit or meaning. Any feeling of connection or spiritual elevation one may sense is illusory.

·         Nevertheless, there are certain spiritual practices, such as prayer, that are permitted to Noahides and for which they are rewarded.

Rav Moshe Weiner in the Sefer Sheva Mitzvos HaShem (The Divine Code)

After reviewing the many interpretations of Maimonides, Rabbi Weiner decides the halakha, law, in accordance with Rav Moshe. However, Rabbi Weiner elucidates12 Rav Moshe’s position further. He explains that there are many mitzvos whose performance need not be motivated by spirituality or reward, but have an immediate real-world benefit. It is possible, and perhaps laudable (and in some instances, even obligatory), for Noahides to perform these mitzvos.

Maimonides writes:

Should a non-Jew wish to perform one of the Torah’s other mitzvos in order to receive merit/benefit, we should not prevent him from doing so even according to all of its details.

Rabbi Weiner explains that the word sekhar may be understood as “merit” or “benefit.” Rabbi Weiner explains that Maimonides’s use implies “benefit.” Therefore, if a Noahide wishes to adopt a mitzvah that provides direct, real-world material or social benefit, it is permitted and, perhaps, even praiseworthy to do so. A Noahide may practice such a mitzvah regularly and according to all of its Torah details.

Mitzvos having real-world material or social benefit would include all of those that are Bein adam le-chaveiro, between man and man, such as:

·        Honoring one’s parents,

·        Tzedaka (charity),

·        Observing the prohibitions against Tzaar Baalei Chayim, animal cruelty,

·        Observing the laws of prohibited speech.

·        There are many other examples that we will discuss in this course.

There are a number of religious observances that are between man and God, Bein Adam le-Makom, that may also be observed, as will be discussed later on.

Rabbis Weiner and Feinstein’s conclusions on Chiddushei Dat outline the guiding principles determining whether or not a Jewish mitzvah may be practiced by a Noahide.

Summary of Lesson

1.      Besides their mitzvos, Noahides may only regularly practice Torah mitzvos

that are:

a.       Compelled by logic,

b.      Provide material or social benefit to the world, society, or the individual,

         a.       Such mitzvos may be practiced according to all of the Torah’s details.

2.      Noahides may not practice any other mitzvah of the Torah:

        a.       Regularly, regardless of motivation,

b.      Even occasionally if he is spiritually motivated to do so,

3.       Any mitzvah unique to Jewish identity or requiring the unique holiness of Israel may not be performed by a Noahide under any circumstances. These include:

       a.       Mezuzah,
       b.      Tefillin,
       c.       Torah Scroll
       d.      Tzitzis
       e.       These specific mitzvos will be discussed in greater detail in a future lesson.

4.       Noahides may not in any way observe Shabbat or the Festivals. However, there are some exceptions that will be discussed in a future lesson.

5.      There are restrictions on what Torah may be studied by Noahides.

6.       The prohibitions of Chiddushei Dat do not exist to reduce or restrict the identity of a Noahide. Similarly the prohibition of Baal Tosif does not exist to reduce or restrict the identity of a Jew. Instead, Chiddushei Dat exists to define the boundaries of Noahism. It clearly delineates where Judaism ends and Noahism begins.

7.       Noahism may drink from the same well as Judaism and share its core beliefs and values, yet it is a religious identity wholly separate and distinct from Judaism. Noahides have their own special mitzvos and missions in the world, as the Jews have theirs. Noahism is not a “Judaism for non-Jews.” Neither is being a Noahide a way for non- Jews to participate in Judaism. For the non-Jew who wishes to observe Jewish rituals or festivals, Maimonides teaches that conversion to Judaism is his only option.